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MAKING "REGIME CHANGE" MULTILATERAL. THE WAR
ON TERROR AND TRANSITIONS To DEMOCRACY
PETER MARGULIES*
Since September 11, American policy at home and abroad has centered on
engineering transitions from political contexts that spawn hatred and violence to
those that promote peace and the rule of law.' Unfortunately, the current Admmi-
stration has proceeded without considering the experience of countnes making
transitions to democracy This article suggests that heeding the lessons of their ex-
perience would produce policies that are both different and more effective.
To effect transitions, the Administration has relied heavily on military force
abroad and the expansion of legal sanctions at home - a top-down set of strategies
that comprise what I call the preemptive model.2 In relying on such strategies,
however, the preemptive model also effectively preempts recognition of the crucial
role played by global inequality Pervasive media and technology allow groups to
perceive inequality transnationally. 3 Inequality shapes social identities, sharpens
social comparisons that prod groups to act, and mobilizes social capital dedicated
to violence. Pursuit of a preemptive model stressing military force obscures the
role of inequality thereby promoting polarization, not transition.
The preemptive approach has attracted criticism from scholars associated with
Professor of Law, Roger Williams University. I thank Kevin Johnson, Diane Orentlicher and partici-
pants at a workshop at the Society of American Law Teachers Conference on Pedagogy and Crisis in
October, 2002 for their comments on a previous draft.
1. This project encompasses number of related areas, including the intervention in Iraq, anti-
terrorism enforcement, and immigration policy. See infra text accompanying notes 2-15 (analyzing
these issues).
2. Use of the term "preemptive" in this Article dovetails with the Administration's espousal of a
doctrine of preemptive force against perceived threats throughout the globe. See The National Security
Strategy of the United States (2002) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (last visited
Apr. 26, 2004). While this national security doctrine is not centerpiece of my discussion here, its ap-
plication to justify the United States military intervention in Iraq set the stage for the issues involving
Iraq' transition to democracy that I analyze in the final section of the piece; See infra text accompany-
ing notes 98-140; For a succinct theoretical and historical defense of the preemptive model, see ROBERT
KAGAN, PARADISE AND POWER 75 (2003) ("[T]he United States has had the difficult task of trying to
abide by, defend, and further the laws of advanced civilized society while simultaneously employing
military force against those who refuse to abide by such rules.").
3. See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 311, 459-73
(2002), citing BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (rev. ed. 1991) (discussing globalization
of information and information's role in formation of global "imagined communities"); Michael C.
Hudson, Imperial Headaches: Managing Unruly Regions in an Age of Globalization, 9 MIDDLE E.
POL'Y 61, 68-70 (Dec. 2002) (discussing impact of media transmission of images that depict suffering
by Arabs and Muslims); Larbi Sadiki, Popular Uprisings and Arab Democratization, 32 INT'L J.
MIDDLE E. STUD. 71, 83 (2000).
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what I call the state-skeptical view While the state-skeptics often advocate for
state measures such as increased foreign aid that seek to remedy material mequal-
ity they typically oppose new state initiatives involving the use of force or legal
sanctions to deter transnational networks' violence against civilians. 4 In their con-
cern with constraining state force, however, the state-skeptics fail to adequately
address the threat to equality posed by violent transnational networks, such as Al
Qaeda, Hamas, or Kach.5 These groups, led by "authenticity entrepreneurs, fo-
ment violence based on nationality, ethnicity, or religion, and frustrate transitions.6
This article advances a multilateral transition model that refines and extends
the literature on transitions to democracy 7 Transitions of the kind that the current
Administration seeks are multilateral, requiring the cooperation of a multitude of
constituencies, including Muslim and Jewish 9 communities that spill across na-
tional borders. Law and policy should frame this dialogue of diasporas to promote
transitions.
The transition scholars identify three factors as crucial to democratic transi-
4. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002); Letti Volpp, The Citizen and the
Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002); Ronald Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, N.Y REV.
BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002, at 44 (asserting that post-September II legislation designed to disrupt terrorist
groups ability to raise funds and recruit new members "sets out new, breathtakingly vague and broad
definition of terrorism" and is "not consistent with our established laws and values").
5. See Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers for
Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173, 197-200 (2003) (discussing violent transna-
tional networks).
6. Id.
7 See GERARD ALEXANDER, THE SOURCES OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION (2002); JUAN J.
LINz & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN
EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 7-9 ( 1996); Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry
Lynn Karl, What Democracy Is and Is Not, in TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY 3 (Geoffrey Pndham ed.,
1995); Gerard Alexander, Institutionalized Uncertainty, The Rule of Law, and the Sources of Democ
ratic Instability, 35 Comp. Pol. Stud. 1145 (2002); Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Democracy, Law, and
Comparative Politics, 36 STUD. COMP INT'L DEv. 7 (Spring 2001); Peter Margulies, Democratic Tran-
sitions and the Future of Asylum Law, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 3 (1999). A valuable complement to the
comparative politics literature is the law and development literature, in which the theme of inclusion
stressed here is a significant focus. See AMY L. CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE
MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003); Amy L. Chua,
Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE
L.J. 1 (1998); CHARLES TILLY, THE POLITICS OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE (2003) (for comprehensive
study that analyzes transition and polarization from historical and social science perspective);
MARTHA MINow, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND
MASS VIOLENCE (1998); Run G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 225 (2000) (for work centering on
the appropriate forms of redress for abuses committed by prior regimes); Ruti Teitel, Transitional Ju-
risprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009 (1997).
8. See ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA: GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERROR 236 (2002) ("It is
international neglect of the Muslim interest in the Palestine and Kashmir conflicts, the presence of US
troops on Saudi soil and the frequent double standards of the big players that have legitimized the use of
violence.").
9. See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 100-01 (1998) (reporting a speech in Los Angeles by
Rabbi Meir Kahane, the New York native who founded the Israeli extremist group Kach, that "de-
scribed Arabs as 'dogs' as people who 'multiply iike fleas' who must be expelled from Israel or elimi-
nated").
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tion and consolidation. The first is institutional repertoire, defined as the range of
a country's social and political institutions, from the nongovernmental organiza-
tions of "civil society" to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. 10 The
second is inclusiveness, defined as the degree to which the country m question
treats all of its constituents as full members." The third element is redress, defined
as the access to remedies for victims of inequity.' 2 Successful multilateral transi-
tions offer all sides a stake in peaceful dispute resolution through inclusion and re-
dress, and deploy force and sanctions authorized by law where necessary to con-
strain authenticity entrepreneurs who are unwilling to invest in peace.13
Transitions are never easy The element of redress, in particular, creates trou-
blesome cross-currents. Ignoring redress can engender disillusionment that un-
dermmes transitions. 14 However, scholars of transitional justice have also recog-
nized that the quest for perfect redress can destroy the mutuality on which all
transitions depend.' 5 For a transition-centered view, balance is everything.
In keeping with this pragmatic outlook, a transition-centered approach mte-
grates difficult measures that might seem mutually exclusive when viewed from
either a preemptive or state-skeptical perspective. For example, a transition model
would require accountability, acknowledgment, and redress from groups that target
civilians for violence, and would uphold the crimmalization of assistance to groups
such as Hamas, Kach, or the "Real IRA that use violence to undermine efforts at
peaceful change.16 However, a transition-centered model would also stress the im-
portance of fair procedures m the adjudication of charges against alleged terrorists,
to do justice and to build perceptions of legitimacy among transnational communi-
ties. 17 The integration of such measures bridges fault lines in order to promote
peaceful change.
This Article is in three parts. Part I analyzes the problems with approaches to
transitions that have sprung up m the wake of September 11. This Part critiques
the preemptive model's failure to address mequality, and the state-skeptics' failure
to acknowledge the pernicious role of authenticity entrepreneurs. Responding to
these flaws, Part II outlines a transition-centered approach based on institutional
repertoire, inclusion, and redress. Part III applies the transition-centered approach
to three pressing global issues: changes in immigration policy after September 11,
regulation of violent transnational networks, and the adjudication of alleged viola-
tions of the law of war.
10. See Margulies, supra note 7
11. Id
12. Id
13. See Peter Margulies, Uncertain Arrivals: Immigration, Terror, and Democracy After Septem-
ber 11, 2002 UTAH L. REv. 481, 507-10 (discussing fairness, transparency, and transitions in transna-
tional humanitarian organizations).
14. See Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice in a New Era, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 893 (2003) (dis-
cussing complexities of transitional redress).
15. Id.
16. However, a transition-centered approach would regulate such efforts carefully to guard against
the perils of vagueness and law enforcement overreachmg. See infra text accompanying notes 56-62.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 84-91.
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1. TERRORISM, TRANSNATIONAL VIOLENCE. AND PROBLEMS OF
TRANSITION
Since September 11, 2001, the policy of the United States government has fo-
cused on the challenges of transitions m law and culture on an international scale.
In Iraq, United States military intervention sought and accomplished a "regime
change" that deposed Saddam Hussein and aims to establish a democratic federa-
tion. President Bush and his advisors persistently linked the Iraq war to the effort
to curb the power and resources of transnational organizations such as Al Qaeda
that carry out violence against civilians. The Bush Administration and its intellec
tual allies have also argued that the Iraq intervention and other steps involving the
use of force will aid the cause of transition throughout the Middle East.
After September 11, a transition to democracy, peace, and the rule of law
from political environments that generate hatred and violence may be a necessity,
not merely an idle aspiration. However, the manifest need for such a transition
should not obscure the challenges inherent in the task. The Administration's ap-
proach to meeting these challenges has been disturbingly one-dimensional. Adopt-
mg a preemptive approach, the Administration has relied on military force and
broad legal sanctions applied by the United States and its allies. Inspired in part by
the neo-Platomc conception of a natural political aristocracy developed by the phi-
losopher Leo Strauss, 8 champions of the preemptive approach have frequently
disdained consultation, consensus, and international law Often, the Administra-
tion has acted m a stark manner that discounts human nghts and civil liberties at
home' 9 and abroad,20 and incurs opportunity costs through the alienation and re-
sentment of those whose support the Administration will need to achieve its
goals.2 ' Indeed, in a worst case scenario, the preemptive approach threatens a
downward drift in which accountability and civil rights are honored more in the
breach than in the observance. 22 This combination of resentment in affected com-
munities and erosion of American democracy is a recipe for global polarization,
18. See Leo Strauss, Plato, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 33, 49 (Leo Strauss & Joseph
Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987) (noting the differences between Platonism and liberal democracy, and ob-
serving that for Plato "[tihe founding of the good city started from the fact that men are by nature dif-
ferent, and this proved to mean that men are by nature of unequal rank [als result, the good city
comes to resemble a caste society"); James Atlas, Leo-Cons; A Classicist's Legacy: New Empire Build-
ers, N.Y TIMES, May 4, 2003, Sec. 4, at I (noting the intellectual debt of influential Administration
figures, such as Paul Wolfowitz, to Strauss, while asserting that the Administration may have neglected
Strauss's own warnings about the abuses of empire).
19. See Cole, supra note 4 (critiquing detention of immigrants after attacks); Margulies, supra note
13; Volpp, supra note 4 (describing the marginalization of particular communities after September I I);
Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and lmmigration Law After September 11,
2001. The Targeting ofArabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 295 (2002).
20. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. THE PARADOx OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD'S ONLY
SUPERPOWER CAN'T Go IT ALONE 35 (2002) (arguing that preemptive approach by the United States
will result in the loss of "important opportunities for cooperation in the solution of global problems
such as terrorism").
21. Id.
22. See Dworkin, supra note 4.
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rather than the mutuality required for successful transitions.
In addition to the war m Iraq, the preemptive approach has been evident m
Administration legal and policy initiatives on three other fronts. In the uninigra-
tion sphere, the Administration has used nationality, religion, and ethmcity as crite-
na to selectively register, apprehend, detain, and deport immigrants.23 By seeking
to regulate transnational networks carrying out violence against civilians, the Ad-
ministration has relied on broad and sometimes vaguely defined statutory language
barring "material support" of groups designated by the Secretary of State as terror-
ist organizations. 24 To prevent future terrorist attacks, the Administration has es-
tablished military tribunals that lack fundamental procedural safeguards. 25 Each
policy has undermined perceptions of legitimacy crucial to the success of antiter-
ronst efforts.
A. Inequality and Social Dynamics
The core problem with the Administration's strategy is its lack of regard for
equality as a factor m the social dynamic that produces violence. The certainty
animating the preemptive approach leaves little room for understanding the com-
plex process underlying the formation of social identity in regions, such as the
Middle East, that acolytes of the preemptive approach hope to shape. Compound-
mg this lack of comprehension is a failure to appreciate the role of identity in fos-
tering social comparisons that provoke concern about unfairness, and the role of
social identity and comparison in turning social capital toward violence.26
Social identity is the first component in the terrorism dynamic. Social iden-
tity theory suggests that people are essentially social beings, concerned with how
they relate to others.27 While the ruling elites that have been the traditional focus
23. Patrick J. McDonnell & Russell Carolio, An Easy Entry for Attackers; Immigrationflaws gar-
ner attention as authorities track the Sept. I I hijackers' movements through the United States, L.A.
TIMEs, Sept. 30, 2001, at Ai (discussing the new policy, which purported to respond to indications that
many of the September I 11
± attackers manipulated Umted States immigration law to enter this country,
but has attracted widespread cnticism by academics and government officials); See Cole, supra note 4;
Akram & Johnson, supra note 19; Margulies, supra note 13; Volpp, supra note 4. Cf Office of the In-
spector General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of
Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks
(June 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/analysis.htm (last visited Apr. 30,
2004>.
24. Cole, supra note 4; Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000),
cert. den. sub nom. Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904 (2001) (upholding statute
against facial challenge, but finding that certain statutory tems were unconstitutionally vague as ap-
plied).
25. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
26. Cntics of the Administration's reliance on force and legal sanctions, whom I refer to collec-
tively as the "state-skeptical" school, also suffer from an incomplete picture of.the interaction between
inequality and social dynamics. See infra text accompanying notes 53-55.
27 See David 0. Sears, et. al., Cultural Diversity and Multicultural Politics: Is Ethnic Balkaniza-
tion Psychologically Inevitable?, in CULTURAL DivIDES: UNDERSTANDING AND OVERCOMING GRoUP
CONFLicT 35, 40-41 (Deborah A. Prentic & Dale T. Miller eds., 1999); Michelle Adams, Intergroup
Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct, and Affirmative Action, 82 B.U. L. REv. 1089, 1100-04 (2002);
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of American law and policy contribute to the formation of social identity, popu-
larly shared experiences of trauma, oppression, or inequity can also play a signifi-
cant role.
The role of trauma is evident in the way the tragic events of September 11
contributed to some Americans' sense of their own identity as a people embattled
in a hostile world. The experience of displacement has also been constitutive for a
broad range of other groups, including African-Americans, 28 Jews,29 and Palestim-
ans, each fashioning narratives of hope and resistance. For Arabs and Muslims
throughout the globe, the Palestinian experience in particular has been a compel-
ling metaphor for threats posed by the West.3i Media technology makes instances
of trauma or perceived disparate treatment, such as the attacks of September 11
against the United States by Al Qaeda, the Israeli government's measures against
alleged Palestinian militants, or the United States military's causing of civilian
casualties during the war in Iraq, immediately available, graphic, and vivid.32
The "social comparisons" fueled by such images can spur change for better or
worse. Identification with a group, coupled with the perception that the treatment
accorded that group is unfair or unjustified, impels people to take action.33 Human
history and experience teach us, however, that intuitions about equity and fairness
can all too easily degenerate into envy, resentment, and rage.34 Particularly when a
group within a society or region that is dominant in terms of numbers, culture, or
historical pedigree feels threatened by those perceived as outsiders, social com-
Diana C. Mutz & Jeffery J. Mondak, Dimensions of Sociotropic Behavior: Group Based Judgments of
Fairness and Well-Being, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 284 (1997); James N. Baron & Jeffrey Pfeffer, The Social
Psychology of Organizations and Inequality, 57 (3) Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 190, 196-98 (1994). See Tilly,
supra note 7, at 32 (discussing political identities as "networks deploying partially shared histories, cul-
tures, and collective connections with other actors").
28. See Adams, supra note 27
29. See generally ANTON LA GUARDIA, WAR WITHOUT END: ISRAELIS, PALESTINIANS, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR A PROMISED LAND (2001).
30. Graham Usher, Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On, 32 J. PALESTINE STUD. 21, 22
(Winter 2003).
31. See Sadiki, supra note 3 (discussing influence of the Palestinian intifada on expressions of
popular sentiment in Jordan and Egypt).
32. See Berman, supra note 3, at 459-73; Hudson, supra note 3, at 68-70; Sadiki, supra note 3.
(This is not to say that any reaction to such trauma or injustice is acceptable. The contours of the right
of self-defense and proportionality will always be crucial in evaluating possible responses. Dispropor-
tionate responses, such as the attacks of September 11, are a sure sign that organizations with their own
agenda have hijacked the formation of social identity.).
33. The Afican-American struggle for civil rights stemmed from just such dynamic. See Ad-
ams, supra note 27 The Zionist movement stemmed from the sentiment that Jews needed home that
could serve as a refuge from the persecution they had encountered in Europe. LA GUARDIA, supra note
29. The yearning of Palestinians for meaningful sovereignty and an end to the displacement caused by
Israeli settlements has an analogous origin. Usher, supra note 30. (discussing Palestinian unrest com-
mencing in September, 2000 as in part a reaction to increased settlement activity subsequent to signing
of the Oslo peace accords).
34. See TILLY, supra note 3, at 141 (discussing "[aictivation of available us-them boundaries" in
course of Rwandan genocide).
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pansons can fuel murderous and even genocidal hatred.35
Where social identity and social comparison go, social capital soon emerges.
Social capital is the constellation of groups, networks, and organizations that help
provide the infrastructure for action.36 Social identity and social comparison can
skew social capital m either positive or negative ways. For example, profound
feelings of powerlessness can turn networks toward self-destructive and risk-prone
behavior.37 When the future looks bleak, many people refuse to invest time and
effort in building long-term institutions.
Instead they adopt an apocalyptic perspective, creating a vacuum between to-
day and eternity 38 This is the temporal domain of the suicide bomber. Suicide
bombings and other acts of coordinated violence require social capital of a special
kind.39 Discipline and coordination are necessary to construct munitions, select a
target, avoid detection, and execute an attack.4° Unfortunately, this brand of social
capital is not readily transferable to the construction of institutions that nurture
democracy and the rule of law.
Modes of social capital and the frammg of social comparison and identity thus
exist in a dialogic relationship. While substantive perspectives on equality and be-
longing shape the form taken by social organizations, the form that emerges also
influences the framing of definitions and claims. For example, highly hierarchical,
secretive, or homogeneous groups are likely to perceive both identity and griev-
ances in a far more polarized fashlon.4i In homogeneous groups, new elites can
emerge, instilling and exploiting a hunger for "authenticity" within the group - a
yearning for an imagmed triumphalist past.
These "authenticity entrepreneurs" can help inaugurate social cascades that
culminate m extreme violence or even genocide.42 Indeed, the twentieth century's
35. See James L. Gibson & Amanda Gouws, Social Identities and Political Intolerance: Linkages
within the South African Mass Public, 44(2) AM. J. POL. Sci. 278, 289 (2000) (discussing linkage be-
tween social identity and intolerance among South African whites).
36. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNiTY 307-18 (2000) (discussing importance of social capital).
37 See Hudson, supra note 3, at 70 ('the network [of Islamists] produces the social-capital re-
wards for membership in addition to the instrumental agendas being put forth [c]odes of dress and
deportment are among the social cues and pressures that attract and consolidate commitment to the
cause[djunng repressive periods Islamists migrated into the subaltern and protected spaces ")
38. See ANDERSON, supra note 3.
39. See TILLY, supra note 7 (discussing "violent specialists"); Bruce Hoffman, The Logic of Suz-
cude Terrorism, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2003, at 43 (quoting a journalist who observes that, "We
hardly ever find that the suicide bomber came by himself. There is always a handler.").
40. Hoffman, supra note 39.
41. See Cass R. Sunstem, Why They Hate Us: The Role of Social Dynamics, 25 HARV J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 429 (2002).
42. See TILLY, supra note 7, at 34 (discussing role of "political entrepreneurs" who "promote vio-
lence by activating boundaries, stones, and relations that have already accumulated histories of vio-
lence; by connecting already violent actors with previously nonviolent allies; by coordinating destruc-
tive campaigns; and by representing their constituencies through threats of violence"); Timur Kuran,
Ethnic Norms and their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623
(1998) (discussing how small changes in perceptions and behavior prompted in part by signals from
2004
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experiences of genocide, from the Nazis in Germany to the Hutu machete-wielders
m Rwanda, often had roots in perceived oppression at the hands of "inauthentic"
others. 43 The lay-person Bin Laden's campaign against infidels m the West, ar-
ticulated m fatwahs" that traditional Islam allows only clerics to issue,45 and
Kach's calls for the expulsion of Palestimans, 46 along with other grim examples,
illustrate how secrecy, homogeneity, and the rhetoric of authenticity have pro-
moted violence against innocents.
B. The Failures of the Preemptive Approach and Its Critics
Unfortunately, the preemptive style, rooted in coercion and legal sanctions,
does little to dislodge the processes of social identity construction and social com-
parison that create a fertile ground for asymmetric violence. Because of this negli-
gible impact on underlying processes, the Administration's approach to disrupting
the social capital of groups practicing asymmetric violence is meffective. Indeed,
the punitive approach in some ways enhances the social capital available for
asymmetric violence, by sharpening the social comparisons that serve as the best
recruitmg tools for those committed to extremism.47
The recent war with Iraq offers an example of a transition that risks spiraling
into polarization. The problem started with the focus of Administration policy-
makers on efficiently achieving a military victory 48 Having geared their efforts
toward war against the Ba'athist regime, policymakers were ill-prepared for the
consequences of the regime's collapse. 49 In particular, policymakers failed to an-
ticipate grass-roots reactions to the power vacuum, such as the protracted cascade
social and political leaders can snowball into massive political upheavals and ethnic strife); Timur
Kuran & Cass R. Sunstem, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999)
(analyzing role of "availability entrepreneurs" m shaping public policy by leveraging stones and images
that are cognitively salient). Ironically, authenticity entrepreneurs often appropriate images and group
structure from those they identify as enemies. See, e.g., Ladan Boroumand & Roya Boroumand, Ter-
ror, Islam, and Democracy, 13(2) J. DEMOCRACY 5, 7-8 (2002) (discussing the influence of Fascism
and Communism on theorists of violent Islamism, including Sayyid Quth); JOHN Es'osrro, UNHOLY
WAR: TERROR iN THE NAME OF ISLAM 20, 32 (2002) (noting Islamic strictures against killing noncom-
batants and Osama bm Laden's disregard of these rules); KHALED ABOU EL FADL, REBELLION AND
VIOLENCE N ISLAMiC LAW 338-39 (2001) (analyzing Qutb's revision of Islamic jundical doctrine on
tolerance for rebellion).
43. See CHuA, supra note 7.
44. See ESPOSITO, supra note 42.
45. Id.
46. See Margulies, supra note 5.
47 See, e.g., Michael P O'Connor & Celia M. Rumani, Into the Fire: How to Avoid Getting
Burned By the Same Mistakes Made Fighting Terrorism in Northern Ireland, 24 CARDOzO L. REV.
1657, 1677 (2003) (noting that restrictive legislation enacted by the British to deter terrorism "alienated
broad swaths of the Northern Irish community, thereby providing assistance to. paramilitary
groups").
48. See Eric Schmitt & David E. Sanger, Aftereffects: Reconstruction Policy; Looting Disrupts De-
tailed U.S. Plan to Restore Iraq, N.Y TiMEs, May 19,2003, at Al.
49. Id.
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of looting that damaged the nation's infrastructure. 50 The devastation deprived
post-Ba'athist civil authorities of essential tools of transition, such as the means to
provide power, water, and basic services to the populace. 5' These failures trig-
gered Iraqi resentment, hmderng the cause of effective transition. Analogous
problems with the preemptive approach beset issues of immigration regulation m
the wake of September 11, efforts to disrupt the human and financial capital of
groups practicing violence against civilians, and attempts to adjudicate violations
of the law of war by alleged terrorists.
The defects of the preemptive perspective cry out for an alternative. Unfortu-
nately, the alternative most vigorously pressed, what I call the state-skeptical ap-
proach, also suffers from significant flaws. The state-skeptical approach is wary of
any expansion of government power. For this reason, champions of the state-
skeptical approach oppose measures that would restrict the financial and human
capital available to organizations such as Al Qaeda, Hamas, or Kach.52 However,
state-skeptics fail to acknowledge the increase in violence against innocents pro-
moted by the "authenticity entrepreneurs" leading such groups, the hateful stereo-
types authenticity entrepreneurs invoke to encourage violence, or the way in which
organizational hierarchy, homogeneity and secrecy facilitate violence. 53  State-
skeptics also forget that groups practicing violence against innocents provide pow-
erful rhetorical ammunition to advocates of the preemptive approach pressing for
punitive responses. This perverse dynamic encourages polarization, and prejudices
the prospects for peaceful transitions. Neither the preemptive nor the state-
skeptical view deals adequately with the challenges of a violent world.
II. A BETTER ALTERNATIVE TO THE PREEMPTIVE APPROACH: THE
TRANSITION-CENTERED VIEW
A transition-centered perspective is better able to respond to these challenges.
50. Id See also TILLY, supra note 7, at 134 (noting that opportunistic "seizure or damage of
property" is a hallmark of "low-capacity regimes, like the chaotic governance arrangements in Iraq
immediately after Saddam's fall, that exert little or no authority over the conduct of their constituents).
51. TILLY, supra note 7, at 134.
52. See Cole, supra note 4 (conceding that A] Qaeda is an organization so intrinsically devoted to
violence that regulation of its access to financial assistance may be appropriate, but offering no readily
cognizable standard that would allow courts to separate permissible from impermissible regulation, un-
plicitly conferring upon A] Qaeda the impunity conferred upon organizations such as Hamas).
53. Id. (Cole acknowledges that security is a legitimate concern of government. However, he re-
gards as suspect measures that crnmmalize the development of an institutional capability for violence.
Moreover, he argues that the First Amendment bars legislation prohibiting financial aid to organizations
like the Palestinian extremist group Hamas, which sponsor both violence and social services. In making
this argument, he ignores both the difficulty of regulating the accounting of organizations based outside
the United States, and the way in which the provision of social services legitimizes the violence perpe-
trated by such groups.) 1d. See Margulies, supra note 13 (discussing organizational synergies within
organizations providing both violence and social services); Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective
Deportation and the First Amendment After Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 313, 330-32 (2000)
(explaining why regulation of transnational organizations practicing violence does not violent first
amendment); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcrofl, 532 U.S. 904 (2001).
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Unlike the preemptive perspective, the transition-centered strategy recognizes that
regime change - either national, regional, or global - is necessarily multilateral.
For this reason, a transition-centered strategy requires reflection about the oppor-
tunity costs uposed by the use of force. While force and legal sanctions have a
role, the transition-centered approach recognizes that using them can set in motion
a dynamic that the side using force cannot fully control. The transition-centered
approach recognizes that a more refined menu of responses is necessary to move
social identity, comparison, and capital away from violence and toward the rule of
law. At the same time, the transition-centered approach acknowledges that when
the state must use force or sanctions against entities practicing violence, it should
use only those measures tailored to the occasion, and should also support the
emergence of alternative entities committed to peaceful change.
A transition-centered approach stems from the substantial body of literature
striving to make sense of the governmental changes occurring throughout the
world in the last quarter-century. Considering regime changes in regions as dispa-
rate as Eastern and Southern Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Afica,
scholars have identified crucial elements in the transition to democracy 54 These
dynamic models recognize that change is complex and unpredictable. As one
commentator has pointed out, "[D]emocratic evolution is [not] a steady process
that is homogeneous over time. temporal discontinuity is implicit.,
55
Creating and maintammg the right mix of elements is a matter of art and
chance, not science. The traditions, institutions, and actors that affect the process
of transition do not necessarily respond to the seeming certainties embodied in
formal law or the application of force. Indeed, this literature explicitly borrows
from conceptions of regime change developed over the centuries by political theo-
rists who viewed such change not as a function of structural or material forces, but
instead as the "contingent product of human collective action,' ' 6 which can move
from despotism to democracy, or just as readily travel m the opposite direction.57
The account of democracy and the rule of law developed by the transition
theorists involve both popular participation and constraint on popular choices. The
transition theorists believe that human beings fulfill themselves when they partici-
pate m decisions regarding the well-being of the community 58 This expression of
self is dynamic, because no mechanical formula - no shorthand of class, race, or
economic interest - can conclusively determine how people speak and act as they
54. See Margulies, supra note 7.
55. See Dankwart A. Rustow, Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, in
TRANSiTiONS TO DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 67.
56. See Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and
Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go? 53 SLAVIC REV 173, 174 (1994).
57 See id. ("There is nothing more difficult to execute, nor more dubious of success, nor more
dangerous to administer than to introduce a new system of things: for he who introduces it has all those
who profit from the old system as his enemies and he has only lukewarm allies in those who might
profit from the new system. quoting NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, ch. VI, 21 (1950)).
58. See O'Donnell, supra note 7, at 113 (arguing that "the discharge of public duties is an enno-
bling activity" and that "dedication to the public good demands and nurtures the highest values").
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engage with the speech and action of others. Regimes must provide for this dy-
namic element, by permitting political expression, and providing avenues for
changing a particular government that incurs popular dissatisfaction. At the same
tune, the rule of law requires institutions such as courts that can check the popular
will m the name of abiding values.5 9
The multilateral transitions required to deal with worldwide issues of asym-
metric violence add new layers of uncertainty. Transitions are unpredictable even
when they hinge largely on the interaction of institutions and actors within a par-
ticular, relatively homogeneous state. When transitions involve ethnic conflict and
links with transnational communities, complexity and unpredictability increase ex-
ponentially
In multilateral transitions, developments within one country can exert a pow-
erful impact on events abroad. This impact is inescapable when, as in efforts to
combat asymmetric violence, one of the countries involved is the world's lone su-
perpower. Moreover, when the locus of transition resides in popular sentiments,
matters of tone and imagery become crucial. Such intangible concerns can be de-
cisive in the formation of social identities and the framing of social comparisons.
This dynamic process can make the difference between the spiraling violence of
polarization and the progress of transition.
While there is no single template for democracy or the rule of law, we can
create an operating definition. 60 A pathway to democracy must ensure input from
all stakeholders and offer protections against overreaching by government and
powerful private groups. The three central elements advanced by the transition
theorists for realizing this definition are 1) inclusion, 2) institutional repertoire;
and, 3) redress. I address each in turn in the following paragraphs.
A. Inclusion
The premuse that participation m politics is the hallmark of democracy mdi-
cates the importance of inclusion. All stakeholders must have the opportunity to
participate. 61 Multilateral transitions expand the pool of persons who should be
considered stakeholders in the process.
Inclusion is important not only for its own sake but because of its instrumen-
tal value. The lessons of social identity, comparison, and capital teach us that ex-
cluded groups despairing about gaming a stake in government may respond to the
urgings of authenticity entrepreneurs.62 In contrast, the shared stakes promoted by
59. See FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND
ABROAD 157-58 (2003) ("Constitutions were meant to tame the passions of the public, creating not
simply democratic but also deliberative government.").
60. See Tilly, supra note 7.
61. The importance of participation in transitions suggests the need for regulating institutions such
as markets that can exacerbate inequality. See Chua, supra note 7; Richard Bilder & Brian Z. Ta-
manaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 470 (1995) (book review).
62. See generally William P Alford, Book Review, 113 HARV. L. REv 1677, 1704 (2000) (noting
that "ethnic tensions" can disrupt transition to democracy).
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inclusion give otherwise disparate parties an incentive to cooperate m shaping new
institutions.63 For example, in Northern Ireland, Catholics' resentment over their
exclusion from power fueled violence that in turn provided an easy justification for
the Umomsts' violent response." Recently, more inclusive processes have en-
couraged Umonists and Catholics to cooperate m a range of complex areas, includ-
Ing health, education, and finance.65 In Sn Lanka, while violence shows signs of
ebbing, decades-long marginalization of the predominantly Hindu Tamil minority
by the predominantly Buddhist Sinhalese majority has prompted brutal attacks by
the extremist Tamil group the "Liberation Tigers." 66 The Sinhalese have responded
in kind.67 Stopping the violence will require inclusive measures such as progress
toward a federated system, allowing autonomy for both groups.68
The situations in Northern Ireland and Sr Lanka are examples of multilateral
transitions. In multilateral transitions, policymakers and actors m the legal system
must appreciate that they have multiple audiences. One audience will consist of
persons designated as members of the polity, such as citizens who can vote in na-
tional elections.69 Another audience consists of lawful permanent residents, who
cannot at present cast a vote m national elections but typically have or will have
the option of becoming citizens m the future, and who participate in the cultural,
social, and political life of the polity in a variety of other ways. 70 However, for a
nation engaged m a multilateral transition process with other countries, entities,
and institutions on a global level, the audience for government decisions is actually
far broader. It includes foreign governments and transnational communities with
members held together by ties of nationality, ethnicity, religion, or ideology.7 I
The expansion of audiences for multilateral transitions has significant unpli-
cations for global initiatives undertaken by the United States and other countries.72
In some cases, policymakers will seek the approval from international bodies such
as the United Nations, as the Bush Administration did both before and after the
63. See Tilly, supra note 7.
64. Id.
65. See Colin Campbell & Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Local Meets Global: Transitional Justice in
Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 871, 886 (2003).
66. See Neil DeVotta, Illiberalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 84, 90-91
(Jan. 2002).
67 Id
68. See id. at 97 (arguing that solution to conflict will involve "a policy of credible devolution that
promotes Tamil self-determination").
69. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE
STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 177-81 (2002) (arguing that many legal distinctions between citi-
zens and lawful resident aliens stem from faulty premises).
70. Id
71. See Tilly, supra note 7 (discussing how emigre communities, such as Insh-Amencans who
supported the Irish Republican Army, can contribute to polarization); Philippe C. Schmitter, Civil Soci-
ety East and West, M CONSOLIDATING THE THIRD WAVE DEMoCRACIES: THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
239, 250 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 1997) (discussing "transnational civil society").
72. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996)
(discussing the need for transnational mutuality and reciprocity in legal doctrine and practice).
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Iraq war .73  Other initiatives, such as global anti-terronsm efforts, also require
transnational agreements and cooperation. Aspects of United States law regarding
foreign nationals, such as refugee law and policy, incorporate provisions from in-
ternational law.74 In addition, policymakers in the United States operate within m-
formal dimensions of accountability. Initiatives by the Umted States, for example
those proposed as elements of antiterrorist enforcement, are subject to judgments
about legitimacy by an array of audiences including the members of transnational
nongovernmental organizations and grass-roots communities abroad. Consent and
meaningful participation by each group is often necessary to the success of the un-
derlying multilateral project.
The virtue of this kind of inclusion is evident even m ostensibly domestic
judgments. 75  Matters generally viewed as at the heart of the polity's self-
definition, such as the admission and removal of immigrants, can shape the effec
tiveness of multilateral transitions. For example, United States immigration poli-
cies that target undocumented immigrants from the Middle East and South Asia
may then intensify the view that anti-terronsin efforts constitute a "war against Is-
lam. 76 Sending a more inclusive message offers transnational communities a
stake in the success of anti-terronism efforts.
77
B. Institutional Repertoire
For transition theorists, inclusion also prompts a healthy development of so-
cial and political organizations that I have elsewhere called "institutional reper-
toire. Policymakers and theorists sometimes equate democracy with the occur-
rence of elections. However, elections are only one facet of a durable transition to
democracy. A repertoire of institutions, including courts, administrative agencies,
and nongovernmental organizations, is necessary.
A varied institutional repertoire of both state and nongovernmental organiza-
73. See Bob Deans, Bush UN. Speech Targets Iraq, ATLANTA J. CONST., Sept. 12, 2002, at 18A.
74. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F Supp. 2d 584, 591-93 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd on other grozds
sub nom., Beharry v. Ashcroft 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003).
75. In this fashion, policymakers recognized that domestic battles over inclusion, such as the civil
rights struggles of the mid-twentieth century United States, had an impact on transnational judgments of
legitimacy regarding the Cold War. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, in
CRITIcAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 110, 115-16 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds.,
1995) (discussing international controversies spurred by racial discrimination within the United States).
76. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, In Palastan, It's Jihad 101, in LONGITUDES AND ATTITUES:
EXPLORING THE WORLD AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 100, 101 (2002) (quoting student in Pakistan madrasa,
or religious school, who described Americans as "unbelievers [who] do not like to befriend Mus-
lims, and want to dominate the world with their power"); GUNARATNA, supra note 8, at 236 (dis-
cussing roots of resentment of American policies m Muslim world); Abbas Amanat, Empowered
Through Violence: The Reinventing oflslamic Extremism, in THE AGE OF TERROR: AMERICA AND THE
WORLD AFTER SEPTEMBER ELEVEN 25, 51 (Strobe Talbot & Nayan Chanda eds., 2001) ("The U.S.
could only benefit from promoting the cause of democracy and open society in the Muslim world and
encouraging voices of moderation, religious tolerance, and human rights.").
77 See infra text accompanying notes 99-118 (discussing immigration and multilateral transi-
tions).
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tions refines deliberation about public issues. It gives participants in the polity a
menu of opportunities for nonviolent engagement, 78 and a multitude of perspec-
tives for fostering reflection. 79 The "horizontal accountability" yielded by institu-
tional repertoire also nurtures commitments to both formal and informal separation
of powers, thus reducing the risk that any single institution will impose an oppres-
sive homogeneity 8
Experienced architects of transitions understand the importance of mstitu-
tional repertoire. In East Timor, for example, where crimes against humanity on
curred in the course of a bitter struggle with Indonesia for independence, the
United Nations has invested substantial time, effort, and funding to promote the
development of an independent judiciary.80 In Islamic countries, hopes for wansi-
tion have been bolstered by the development of indigenous women's organiza-
tions.
8 1
Authenticity entrepreneurs whose regimes and organizations embrace violent
exclusionary practices tend to narrow institutional repertoires. Authenticity entre-
preneurs can come in all shapes and sizes, from the genocidal demagogues of
Rwanda8 2 to government officials who invoke fear of violence committed by oth-
ers as a justification for expanding state power.8 3 Authenticity entrepreneurs ac
cumulate power not through the peaceful resolution of disputes, but through the
ratchetmg up of violence.
In a multilateral context involving disputes between groups, countries, or re-
gions, this narrowing of repertoires is often contagious. As the Israeli-Palestmian
conflict demonstrates, escalating violence discredits those seeking peaceful means
for resolving disputes.8 The result is not transition, but polarization. Confronting
78. See TILLY, supra note 7, at 120-27 (noting that ethnic or religious violence in areas such as
Northern Ireland has historically been linked with a narrow repertoire of occasions such as holidays that
sparked rival public demonstrations).
79. See Ziad Abu-Amr, Pluralism and the Palestinians, J. DEMOCRACY, July 1996, at 83, 90-91
(noting that the Palestinian Legislative Council has the potential to operate as counter-weight to ex-
cesses within the Palestinian Authority).
80. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor,
U.N. SCOR, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1223 (2002), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/re-
ports/2002/sgrepO2.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2004).
81. See Janine Astrid Clark & Jillian Schwedler, Who Opened the Window? Women's Activism m
Islamist Parties, 35 COMP. POL. 293 (2003).
82. See TILLY, supra note 7.
83. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concumng) (observing that "emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies"); see also Cole,
supra note 4 (criticizing policies of Attorney General Ashcroft); Akram & Johnson, supra note 19; Lely
T. Djuharl, President Hints She Will Back Vigilante Teams, SEATTLE TIMES, July 6, 2003, at A3 (quot-
ing Indonesian president as suggesting that the mobilization of armed groups of citizens, which has al-
ready led to substantial human rights violations in the last 5 years in East Timor and elsewhere, may be
necessary to deal with separatists in Aceh); Jane Perlez, Indonesia Says Drive Against Separatists Will
Not End Soon, N.Y. TiMEs, July 9, 2003, at A3 (discussing United States efforts to deal with human
rights abuses of Indonesian military, complicated by need for military's cooperation in anti-terrorist
efforts).
84. See Andrew Kydd & Barbara F Walter, Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics ofExtremist Vio-
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violence, policymakers aid the cause of transition by deterring authenticity entre-
preneurs, nurturng alternatives, and guarding against their own surrender to au-
thenticity entrepreneurship's temptations.
C. Redress
When authenticity entrepreneurs twist transition into polarization, redress is
crucial in putting the process back on track. Redress signals both a commitment to
inclusion, and an "all-clear" for those brave souls willing to invest their time, ef-
fort, and well-being in the development of a rich and varied institutional reper-
toire.8 5 In this sense, remedies to uphold the claims of the weak against the power-
ful are a bulwark of democracy and the rule of law.8 6 A transition without redress
is inherently unstable - a camouflaged continuation of the status quo that will
eventually give way to violence. However, demands for complete redress can also
destabilize the transition agenda.
Transitional redress is most effective in conjunction with commitments to
both inclusion and institutional repertoire. To serve inclusion, avenues for redress
should be the product of dialogue. For example, debates about reparations in the
United States have brought to the surface subjects submerged in generations of op-
pression, such as corporate complicity with slavery. Transitions that approach re-
dress in a top-down fashion, categorically ruling out classes of remedies, suppress
conversations that are difficult, but necessary. Consider here the eventual failure
of the Oslo peace process in the Middle East: the politicians that signed the Oslo
accord sought to glide by wrenching issues such as settlements and the return of
refugees to Israel. When these crucial issues re-emerged, they combined with fail-
ures of leadership on both sides to fuel the polarization of the second Palestinian
intifada.8 7
Institutional repertoire also plays a central role in transitional redress. Truth
and reconciliation commissions developed in Latin America, South Africa, and
elsewhere to supplement and supplant legalistic vehicles for redress such as repara-
tions and crimmal prosecution of human rights violators.88 Such innovations may
be particularly appropriate as touchstones for transition in multi-ethnic conflict, m
which authenticity entrepreneurs on both sides have fostered a discourse of stereo-
typed narratives. Allowing people at the grass roots to break through those narra-
tives and model a different kind of conversation for the future can consolidate tran-
lence, 56 INT'L ORG. 263 (2002).
85. See Guillermo O'Donnell, Illusions About Consolidation, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1996, at 34,
36-37 (noting that democracy must "include an intertemporal dimension: the generalized expectation
that. freedoms will continue into an indefinite future").
86. See id. at 45 (noting many states with ostensibly democratic elections still deprive people of
rights and participation, citing examples including "[t]he rights of battered women to sue their husbands
and of peasants to obtain a fair trial against their landlords, the inviolability of domiciles in poor
neighborhoods, and in general the right of the poor and various mmonties to decent treatment and fair
access to public agencies and courts").
87. See Usher, supra note 30.
88. See Teitel, supra note 14, at 902-03.
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sitional momentum. However, redress of material inequality should accompany
the symbolic and affective benefits of truth and reconciliation commissions. In an
emerging democracy such as South Africa, persistent economic inequality has
eroded some of the good will accorded post-apartheid reforms, with a rising num-
ber of blacks telling pollsters that their lives were better under apartheid. 9
A pragmatic repertoire of remedies is also vital because the search for perfect
redress can undermine transition. In some Eastern Bloc countries, for example,
"lustration" - the exposure and prosecution of ex-Communist officials - became a
kind of fetish for ostensible reformers such as Solidarity once they acceded to
power. The result was a neglect of other policy goals, such as economic develop-
ment.90 In dealing with the remnants of a dictatorship, punishment of key figures
will send a powerful message of transition, while sparing people who had little
choice but to serve the regime and whose help is required for a successful transi-
tion.9i Indeed, in a multilateral transition involving at least two organizations or
entities, the demand of one or more sides for complete redress may foster not tran-
sition, but increased polarization.
III. APPLYING A TRANSITION-CENTERED APPROACH
The criteria of inclusion, institutional repertoire, and redress can mform law
and policy on multilateral transitions. Employing a transition-centered analysis
can illustrate the limits of relying on force and legal sanctions. Yet, a transition-
centered analysis can also provide a clearer case for state intervention to level the
playing field between groups practicing violence and groups seeking non-violent
alternatives. This section explores the relevance of transition-centered analysis for
three problems related to transnational asymmetric violence: 1) immigration policy
after September 11, 2) the regulation of organizations that practice violence against
civilians; and 3) the adjudication of alleged violations of international humanitar-
ian law.
A. Immigration Enforcement after September II
Viewing the struggle against asymmetric violence as a process of multilateral
transition can furnish support for a re-frammg of bodies of law traditionally left to
the discretion of the government, such as laws governing immigration. As noted
above, the relevant audience for United States immigration law is not merely do-
89. See Robert Mattes, South Africa: Democracy Without the People? J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2002,
at 22, 32; Brandon Hamber, Dealing with the Past: Rights and Reasons: Challenges for Truth Recovery
in South Africa and Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1074, 1074-87 (2003) (discussing disap-
pointment felt by some victims of apartheid in work of South African truth and reconciliation commis-
sion).
90. See Denise V Powers & James H. Cox, Echoes from the Past: The Relationship between Sat-
isfaction with Economic Reforms and Voting Behavior in Poland, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV 617, 627-28
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mestic m nature, but transnational.92 Perceptions of unfairness shared by the trans-
national audience undercut the legitimacy of United States law, and the effective-
ness of United States antiterronst policy The use by courts of international in-
struments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child to inform the interpretation of
statutory rights under United States immigration law would bolster international
perceptions of the legitunacy of United States law by promoting the values of in-
clusion, institutional repertoire, and redress.9 3
Current United States immigration jurisprudence gives plenary substantive
authority to Congress and broad enforcement discretion to the executive branch.94
Substantial authority and discretion are not necessarily inconsistent with the multi-
lateral transition paradigm.95 However, the degree of authority exercised by the
political branches in the United States over immigration can also frustrate multilat-
eral transitions.
This frustration stems from the way m which the authority over immigration
exercised m the United States by the political branches of government lends itself
to the scapegoating practiced by governmental authenticity entrepreneurs. When
government faces challenging problems, officials can target immigrants.9 6 Princi-
ples of liberty and equality that typically constram the government are. often not
available to check such measures m the immigration context. 97 The Justice De-
partment's effort in the wake of September 11 to detain and deport undocumented
Immigrants from the Middle East and South Asia and conduct minigration pro-
ceedings in secret was a product of this lack of accountability 98
92. See supra text accompanying notes 74-80.
93. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entry into force Mar. 23, 1976, available
at www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/accpr.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
94. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimnation Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
95. The ability of sovereign states to define themselves through criteria for entry preserves an m-
ternational repertoire of heterogeneity, providing useful check on the homogenizing force of trends
toward globalization of culture and commerce. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983). Furthermore, some authority over entry is necessary
to deter authenticity entrepreneurs and their organizations outside the polity from using the immigration
system to stage violent attacks on the polity's population and institutions. The ability of the September
II attackers to "game the system" through the use and abuse of student and visitors' visas demonstrates
the importance and difficulty of immigration enforcement.
96. See BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER 33-38 (2001) (discussing invocation in
public discourse of "us versus them" stereotypes that justify restrictive immigration measures).
97. See Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (holding that Congress has "plenary
power" over immigration); Alemikoff, supra note 68 (critiquing plenary power doctrine); Linda Kelly,
Defying Membership: The Evolving Role of lmmigration Jurisprudence, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 185 (1998);
Linda S. Bosmak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv
1047, 1130-33 (1994) (analyzing disparities in First Amendment rights between aliens and citizens).
98. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953 (2002) (critiquing detention of immi-
grants after attacks); Margulies, Uncertain Arrnalssupra note 13; Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Ter-
rorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002) (describing the marginalization of particular communities after
September 11); Akram & Johnson, supra note 19. See generally Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should
Responses to Violent Crisis Always Be Constitutionai? 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003) (arguing that gov-
ernment officials should fashion criteria for national emergencies justifying relaxation of constitutional
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The government's reliance after September 11 on nationality, ethncity, and
religion as criteria for immigration enforcement has uprooted many persons with
no connection to asymmetric violence. 99 For example, the government's registra-
tion program, which requires Immigrants from designated countries with substan-
tial Muslim populations to register with the government, will result in the deporta-
tion of thousand of Pakistanis who are not documented, but have often been living
and working in this country for a number of years.1°° Many of these immigrants
have been performing low-paid jobs that in effect subsidize American consum-
ers. I0' Many immigrant children also find themselves in this hapless group.
10 2
These children, who often came to this country at a young age, had no control over
their parents' decision to seek to emigrate from their country or origin. The gov-
ernment's policy of registration followed by deportation fails to take into account
the ties immigrants have developed in this country, the value of the work they have
performed, or the hardship immigrant children would undergo in returning to a
country that they barely know.'
0 3
In addition to its direct human cost, the harshness of post-September I I im-
migration policy frustrates the process of multilateral transition required to reduce
the threat of asymmetric violence. A harsh immigration policy buttresses the
widespread view in the Middle East and South Asia that the United States has tar-
geted Muslims. Repeated disavowals by the Administration of an intent to trigger
a "clash of civilizations" have little resonance when juxtaposed with the spectacle
of thousands of displaced people. 104 In a worst-case scenario, such policies make
the "clash of civilizations" a self-fulfilling prophecy, alienating crucial communi-
ties abroad.
A greater judicial role in reviewing iunmigration decisions in light of interna-
tional agreements could remedy the myopia that afflicts current Administration
regimes, and be held accountable for defending those criteria and implementing them consistently).
99. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 215 F Supp.2d 94, 98 n.4
(D.D.C. 2002) (noting government concession that many aliens detained or deported after September II
had no terrorist ties), rev'd on other grounds, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Stephen J. Ellmann, Ra-
cial Profiling and Terrorism, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv 675, 724-26 (2003) (discussing lack of concrete
information about terrorism yielded by government's immigration measures); Adam Liptak, The Pur-
suit of Immigrants in America After Sept. 11, N.Y. TiMES, June 8,2003, at 4.
100. Cathenne Utley, Fear and Loathing of US Immigrant Rule, BBC World Service News, Jan.
27, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/2698467.stm (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
101. See HONIG, supra note 95.
102. Id
103. Post-September II immigration restrictions have also had an adverse impact on other groups,
such as Mexican immigrants who, before the attacks, had hoped for greater coordination and coopera-
tion between the United States and Mexico on opportunities to earn legal status. See Kevin R. Johnson,
Beyond Belonging: Challenging the Boundaries of Nationality: September II and Mexican Immigrants:
Collateral Damage Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REv 849, 858-59 (2003) (discussing new obstacles
for approval of visas for prospective Mexican immigrants after attacks).
104. While the Administration states the law accurately in asserting that undocumented immi-
grants have no legal expectation of remaining in the United States, these assertions are unconvincing as
a policy matter. Given the small percentage of undocumented immugrants from South Asia or the Mid-
dle East, policy that did not single out these individuals would be at least as effective from an immi-
gration enforcement perspective.
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policy and the polarization thereby produced. Recent Supreme Court precedent
provides a narrow window for such efforts to broaden the institutional repertoire
available in immigration law, particularly on the issue of executive discretion.'
05
At least one venturesome court has sought to deal with the problems of displace-
ment of immigrant children and families created by draconian pre-September 11
legislative measures by reading into legislation the anti-displacement mandate in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) and the Interna-
tional Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).' °6 While the Court's effort
foundered on appeal because of both doctrinal and procedural obstacles,'0 7 this re-
sult does not preclude a renewed effort centering on post-September 11 enforce-
ment actions by the executive.
Courts could read the statute authorizing removal of undocumented immi-
grants to allow for a hearing on the issue of disruption to families and hardship to
immigrant children.10 8 This initiative would also provide a form of redress for
immigrants used as low-cost labor in the United States economy and then cast
aside because authenticity entrepreneurs in government reacting to the trauma of
September 11 needed to "round up the usual suspects. Alternatively, courts could
focus on inclusion directly by holding that the clear intent to target immigrants
from the Middle East and South Asia, the discrimiatory effect of such targeting,
and the lack of fit between such targeting and bona fide antiterrorism efforts, fall
within the narrow ambit of selective enforcement claims that the courts would en-
tertain i the immigration context.
While significant difficulties, including the courts' tendency to view any os-
tensible anti-terronsm measure as a function of the war and foreign affairs power,
would attend such a judicial approach, the effort is worth making. Even if unsuc
cessful, a case could provide a focus for mobilizing people and narratives that
105. See Reno v. Amencan-Arab Anti-Discnimnation Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (argung for
wide prosecutonal discretion, but suggesting that some cases may be sufficiently egregious to warrant
judicial intervention),
106. See Beharry v. Reno, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003) citing CCPR Article 23(i) (noting the fun-
damental nature of the family) and CRC Article 3 (asserting that best interests of child should be the
"primary consideration" of courts, agencies, and legislatures)), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Be-
harry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003). See also Maria v. McElroy, 68 F Supp. 2d 206, 219-20
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing role of international law in determining whether immigration legislation
that expanded grounds for deportation should be retroactive); Sonja Start & Lea Brilmayer, Family
Separation as Violation of International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 213 (2003) (discussing Be-
harry and Maria district court opinions). See Linda Kelly, Family Planning, American Style, 52 ALA. L.
REv. 943 (2001) (discussing limitations of conceptions of family in American immigration law); Joan
Fitzpatrick, The Gender Dimension of US. Immigration Policy, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 23 (1997)
(analyzing invidious gender consequences of United States immigration policy).
107. See Beharry v. Reno, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003).
108. See generally Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law As Canon of Domestic
Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REv 1103 (1990); Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481
(2003) (invalidating sodomy law as invasion of privacy, citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (1981), which held that anti-sodomy laws were invalid under European Convention on Human
Rights).
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could prompt legislative or administrative reform.10 9 Legal reform would promote
the good will of transnational constituencies vital for a multilateral transition in the
struggle against asymmetric violence.
B. Regulating Organizations That Practice Violence
A multilateral transition approach can also help shape the legal and policy
landscape populated by terrorist organizations and governments seeking to combat
terrorist threats. Governments can appropriately regulate the flow of human and
financial capital to transnational authenticity entrepreneurs who practice violence.
A multilateral approach would recognize, however, that the application of legal
sanctions is merely one element in a repertoire of responses. Over-reliance on le-
gal sanctions can promote polarization and provide a vehicle for government offi-
cials tempted by the advantages yielded by authenticity entrepreneurship. A transi-
tion-centered approach would restrain government officials here and abroad who
Invoke the threat of terrorism as a basis for repressive measures. In addition, a
transition-centered approach would seek out and support indigenous, inclusive al-
ternatives to the violent enterprises of authenticity entrepreneurs.
Authenticity entrepreneurs in government or oppositional roles who practice
organized violence undermine core transition values. The violence they authorize
and promote damages inclusion, often targeting civilians on the basis of ethnicity,
nationality, or religion. For example, in the Israeli-Palestmian conflict, one op-
positional group has targeted Jews,' i0 while another group seeks to evict Palestini-
ans.II Violence against innocents also narrows institutional repertoire. As the Is-
raeli-Palestmian conflict demonstrates, the use of violence on one side bolsters the
credibility of those on the other side who wish to reply in kind, and discredits
moderates.' i2 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict offers convincing evidence that the
trauma wrought by violence multiplies claims for redress on each side of a multi-
lateral transition, creating further hurdles for a peaceful outcome.
The polarizing violence sought by authenticity entrepreneurs emerges not
only from substantive grievances, but also from an infrastructure of social capital
common to most "coordinated destruction." '' i Whatever the sentiments of those
109. Reform could occur through special legislative action to provide relief to the substantial
Pakistani undocumented community. Concerns about hardship and fairness produced significant legis-
lation of this kind in the 1990's. See Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, H.R.
2607, 105' h Cong. (1997) (enacted), discussed in Kelly, supra note 105. Administrative reform could
occur through adopting a regime of deliberative enforcement that focused on the opportunity costs, such
as alienation and resentment, of mechanical application of immigration law to communities selected
on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, or religion.
110. See LA GUARDIA, supra note 29, at 295 (noting that the Palestinian extremist group Hamas
claims that, "Tlhe Jews were the instigators of the First World War, which led to the destruction of the
Islamic caliphate, and set up the United Nations as a means of ruling the world").
111. See HOFFMAN, supra note 9 (discussing Kach).
112. See Andrew Kydd & Barbara F Walter, Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Vio-
lence, 56 INT'L ORG. 263 (2002).
113. See TILLY, supra note 7.
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persons persuaded by authenticity entrepreneurs to destroy themselves m order to
kill others, executing attacks requires a core cadre of "violent specialists," who
have a vested interest m continuing their activities and discouraging other forms of
dispute resolution. This cadre performs an array of organizational tasks, including
selecting a target, making explosives, producing the bomber's valedictory video-
tape, conferng financial rewards on the bomber's family, and soliciting financial
contributions to the enterprise, sometimes from unwitting donors. 114 Violent spe-
cialists often require secrecy, and rarely sponsor reflection. " 5
To allow each side of a multilateral dispute to foster inclusion and develop a
richer institutional repertoire, governments must stem the flow of human and fi-
nancial capital to violent authenticity entrepreneurs. The United States Congress,
for example, has prohibited the provision of "material support" to organizations
such as Kach and Hamas designated by the Secretary of State as pursuing a strat-
egy of asymmetric violence. 1 6 Such legislation is permissible if it does not bar
purely political speech, but instead focuses on the organization's command struc-
ture for acts of violence, its solicitation of financial services and support, and its
provision of logistical assistance and specialized instruction such as explosives
training."17
Stemming the flow of human and financial capital to groups practicing vio-
lence has aided the progress of multilateral transitions in places as diverse as
Northern Ireland and Sr Lanka. 1 8 Regulating capital flows prompts greater trans-
parency in fund-raising and accounting, denting the secrecy and deception central
to violent organizations. Regulation of capital flows can encourage transnational
communities that support such organizations to become more vigilant, asking
probing questions about the activities funded by their contributions.i" 9 When or-
ganizations cannot furnish satisfactory answers, underwriting communities may
start new organizations that promote nonviolent reform.
However, regulating capital flows to organizations practicing asymmetric vio-
lence also has perils. In some cases, government designations of groups as terror-
1st organizations may be hasty or inaccurate. Such "false positives" can create ir-
remediable harm, particularly where organizations, such as Al Barakaat in
Somalia, are central to the economy of a country or region. 120 Investigations of
114. See HOFFMAN, supra note 9.
115. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42.
116. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2003).
117 Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9n Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub
nom Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcrofl, 532 U.S. 904 (2001). But see Cole, supra note 4 (arguing
that statute violates first amendment).
118. See Thomas L. Friedman, Lessons from Sri Lanka, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002, at A17 (noting
moderating force on LTTE "Tigers" group in Sn Lanka when "Tamil diaspora started choking off
their funds").
119. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES To DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30-43 (1970) (discussing role of "voice" in curing group com-
placency).
120. See Margulies, supra note 13, at 510 (noting lack of fairness in Somalia episode); Donald G.
McNeil, Jr., A Nation Challenged: Sanctions; How Blocking Assets Erased a Wisp of Prosperity, N.Y
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suspected groups may be unduly mtrusive, such as the F.B.I. raids on Muslim or-
ganizations m the Spring of 2002 that have thus far yielded no indictments, but
created substantial fear and resentment in the community 121 Statutes that expand
the threshold of culpability by prohibiting activity such as "material support" of
terrorist organizations can also be vague as applied, chilling protected activities
such as legal defense or expressions of solidarity from members of the public.
122
In such cases of overreaching, anti-terronst enforcement becomes a tool to enhance
the authority of authenticity entrepreneurs within the government.
Regulation of capital flows to organizations engaged m multilateral disputes
can also prompt polarization if transnational constituencies perceive regulation as
favoring an oppressive status quo. By definition, such regulation does not target
friendly governments that may pursue inequitable policies subsidized directly or
indirectly by the regulating country's taxpayers, such as the Israeli government's
expansion of settlements on the West Bank. To rectify such imbalances, regulating
countries must use their leverage to promote more equitable policies on the part of
friendly regimes.
A pragmatic approach to redress is also important in regulating organizational
violence. If a regulating government erroneously classifies an organization as a
terrorist group, it should seek to compensate persons and entities affected by the
resulting dislocation. By the same token, to consummate a transition, an organiza-
tion that has practiced violence should be prepared to acknowledge the harm it has
caused and implement procedures that reflect accountability, transparency, and a
commitment to non-violence. Groups that take this route should be eligible to seek
a legal safe harbor. This legal device, which the approach suggested m this Article
would refer to as "transition relief," would operate much like bankruptcy, limitmg
claims for organizations that sought to make a fresh start. Groups that reject such
transitional steps should not expect relief from regulation. 123
The justifications for regulation and redress regarding organizations do not
extend to extralegal remedies. The "targeted killing" or assassination of suspected
practitioners of violence by government, including the Israeli government's killing
TIMEs, Apr. 13, 2002, at A10 (discussing hardship in Somalia caused by asset freeze); See Nat'i Coun-
cil of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that Secretary of
State had to provide organization with an opportunity to present evidence demonstrating it does not
support terrorism prior to freezing assets).
121. See Panel, Civil Liberties and Muslims in the U.S. After 9-11: What is Really Happening?,
Sponsored by Karamah and the Journal of Law and Religion, El Hibn Foundation, Washington, D.C.,
(Jan. 3, 2003); See Douglas Farah & John Mintz, U.S. Trails Va. Muslim Money, Ties; Clues Raise
Questions About Terror Funding, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2002, at At (quoting members of Muslim com-
munity who criticized what they viewed as heavy-handed government methods).
122. See Margulies, supra note 5, at 203-06.
123. To ensure that redress is also effective to curb abuses by friendly governments, survivors of
such excesses should be able to pursue claims under statutes such as the Alien Tort Claims Act to hold
multinational corporations accountable for participating in or benefiting from repressive practices. See
Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, III YALE L.J.
443 (2001) (arguing that multinational corporations should be held accountable for human rights viola-
tions resulting from enterprises over which they have control).
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of Hamas leaders, 124 suffers from the same flaws as killings carred out by transna-
tional oppositional organizations. Such summary measures do not comfortably fit
within the procedural safeguards of law enforcement, the temporal and geographic
bounds of most wars, 12 or the obligations to a civilian population undertaken by
an occupying power.126 Targeted killings shrink institutional repertoire by decreas-
ing the stake of each side in peaceful means of dispute resolution. They also un-
dermine inclusion, because they tend to affect not only specifically intended tar-
gets, but also civilians from the same communities who happen to be in the way.
Finally, the regulation of organizational asymmetric violence must also entail
assistance to nonviolent organizations. Such assistance expands institutional reper-
toire, and combats the exclusion that can stem from blanket assumptions about
transnational communities.127  For example, conventional wisdom in the West
seems to hold that Islamic parties offer women few opportunities for voice, and
reject democratic values. 128  However, the reality is far more complex. Women
have been able to develop substantive roles in many Islamic organizations, and
124. See Laia El-Haddad, Israel Continues Assassination Policy, Aljazeeranet at
http://english.aljazeera.netlNR/exeres/75B25D3C-IFF3-4F75-9B1E-9E7AI60FODBF.hin (Jan. 4,
2003) (last visited Mar. 23, 2004).
125. See Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War 25 HARe. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457
(2002) (discussing uneasy fit of both terrorism and anti-terrorism enforcement within "war" or "crime"
paradigms).
126. Some experts defending the Israeli government's use of "targeted killings" argue that the
situation in the West Bank and Gaza is tantamount to what in the law of war is called "belligerent occu-
pation, under which substantial parts of the disputed temtory are under the control of the enemy. A
state of belligerent occupation would give the occupying force more leeway to take lethal action against
suspected enemy personnel, subject to the constraints of proportionality and reasonableness. Even un-
der this more permissive standard, however, substantial doubt exists as to whether the IDF has taken
into account the likelihood of civilian casualties resulting from targeted killings. See generally Kath-
leen A. Cavanaugh, Selective Justice: The Case of Israel and the Occupied Territories, 26 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 934, 943-44 (2003) (citing Hague Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, Sec. Ill, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539). Cf Emanuel Gross, Democracy m
the War Against Terrorism - The Israeli Experience, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1161, 1194 (2002) (arguing
that the IDF has acted consistently with proportionality and reasonableness). In Gaza in the Summer of
2002, for example, more than ten civilians died when IDF aircraft attacked an apartment complex to kill
Hamas military leader. Other punitive measures pursued by the IDF including the demolition of the
houses occupied by the families of accused terrorists, are equally troubling. While the legality of tar-
geted killing is sub judice at the Supreme Court of Israel, the Court has upheld the practice of house
demolitions. The Court's holding, while requiring some showing of a link between other residents of
the household and the alleged terrorist, accepts the military's contention that house demolitions have a
"deterrent" effect on violence. See, e.g., Alamarn v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip, HCJ 2722/92
(IDF commander has discretion to destroy single-family home if one occupant has committed terronst
act, but may lack authority to order destruction of multiple-unit dwelling absent proof that residents of
separate units were complicit in behavior). However, both the law of occupation, with its limits on col-
lective punishment, and the msights of the transition scholars, demonstrate the contrary. Each holds
expressly or implicitly that over-broad punitive actions will merely galvanize occupied communities to
engage in further violence.
127 See Adrien Katherine Wing, The Palestinian Basic Law: Embryonic Constitutionalism, 31
CASE W RES. J. INT'L L. 383, 392-94 (1999) (discussing strengths and weaknesses of disparate Pales-
tinian civil society).
128. See Volpp, supra note 4 (critiquing this view as essentialist).
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scholars have articulated visions of Islamic law that embrace women's rights.129
The same can be said for democratic values. Governments can nurture such efforts
not only with direct assistance, but with reforms in their own policies that respond
to legitimate grievances.13
0
C. Adjudicating Violations of the Law of War and Crimes against Humanity
Few matters since September 11 have excited more scholarly commentary
than issues regarding the appropriate forum and procedures for the adjudication of
alleged violations of the law of war. In the wake of the United States-led military
intervention in Iraq, analogous questions have begun to arise about the adjudica-
tion of alleged crimes against humanity perpetrated by Saddam Hussein and his
subordinates. Much of the debate has conflated issues regarding the appropriate
forum for such decisions and the fairness of procedures applicable In a particular
forum, such as the military tribunals established by the current Admimstration.
1 3
1
129. See Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003); Janine A. Clark & Jillian
Schwedler, Who Opened the Door? Women's Activism in Islamist Parties, 35 COMP. PoLITICs 293
(April 2003); Heiner Bielefeldt, "Western Versus "Islamic Human Rights Conceptions? A Critique
of Cultural Essentialism in the Discussion on Human Rights, 28 POL. THEORY 90, 109-12 (2000). See
generally NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICAN AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY
62-68 (2003) (discussing gender, political, and religious equality in Islamic polities).
130. In the Middle East, for example, Israel's creation by the United Nations offfered both neces-
sary redress for the worldwide persecution of Jews and sanctuary from future persecution, See LA
GUARDIA, supra note 29, at 360 (noting that "the U.N. partitioned Palestine to create a Jewish state as
an act of expiation for the Holocaust") However, it also displaced significant numbers of Palestinians;
George E. Bisharat, Lana Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 43 AM. U. L.
REV. 467 (1994) (discussing history of displacement of Palestinians); Benny Mors, The Rejection,
NEw REPUBLIC, April 21, 2003, at 31 (book review) (critiquing persistent hold of authenticity entrepre-
neurs over Palestinian nationalist efforts, while acknowledging that Israeli government policies suc-
ceeded in "ultimately displacing more than half the Palestinians from their homes" inside Israel). Such
actions have compounded processes of social comparison that increase the credibility of violent authen-
ticity entrepreneurs on each side. Crucial steps taken by Israel, in conjunction with reforms undertaken
by the Palestinian Authority, could include an apology for the government's role in spumng the outflow
of refugees in 1948, compensation for Palestinians displaced at that time, and the recognition of en-
hanced but not absolute immigration rights for Arab Israelis seeking to sponsor relatives, including
refugees from 1948 and their descendants, for lawful residence. Such fimily reunification policy,
phased in over time, would be limited version of "right of return" for Palestinians that would also
preserve the sanctuary for Jews contemplated in the United Nations' creation of the State of Israel; In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, Article 12(4) (1966)
(providing that refugees wishing to return to their country of origin have right to repatriation, although
countries of origin can derogate from their obligations upon declaration of state of emergency); Cf
Vic Ullom, Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees and Customary International Law, 29 DENVER J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 115, 142 (2001); John Quigley, Displaced Palestinians and Right of Return, 39 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 171 (1998).
131. For sampling of this extensive debate, compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 249 (2002) (arguing for validity of
Administration's Military Order establishing military tribunals); Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstem,
Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT.
261, 274-75 (2002) (discussing statutory authority for military tribunals); Kenneth Anderson, What to
Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists? A Qualified Defense of Military Commissions and United
States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 591, 613-20
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A transition-centered approach would disaggregate those issues. In the realm of
procedure, it would consider whether safeguards exist to assure the international
community that a forum's determinations are fair. To resolve issues of forum se-
lection, a transition-centered approach would consider the stake of a particular
state m adjudicating such cases, as well as the accuracy and reliability of the forum
proposed. 132
Critics have rightly focused on the problematic nature of procedures for the
military jurisdiction of the tribunals, which encompass not merely violations of the
law of war such as the killing of civilians or the conduct of hostilities by forces act-
mg without appropriate identification, but also expressions of status such as mem-
bership in Al Qaeda. 133 This broad jurisdiction takes the tribunals far beyond the
adjudication of cases involving "enemy belligerents" engaged m specific opera-
tions directed at United States persons or property. 134 A second procedural prob-
lem is the treatment of counsel for the accused, who are subjected to monitoring of
conversations with clients. 35 Thirdly, Administration sources have indicated in
undocumented conversations with journalists that core guarantees of the criminal
justice system, such as access to exculpatory evidence, might be unavailable.
36
Finally, the Administration has resisted any express provision for judicial re-
view,137 and has argued, thus far successfully, that the courts lack jurisdiction over
proceedings at the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 138 These
(2002) (arguing that military tribunals are appropriate under international law); Neal K. Katyal & Laur-
ence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, Ill YALE L.J. 1259 (2002)
(arguing that express legislative authority, including declaration of war, is required); Jonathan Turley,
Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in Madisoman Democ
racy, 70 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 649, 735-39 (2002) (critiquing Quirm); Diane F Orentlicher & Robert
Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes to War- Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 25
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 653, 656-57 (2002) (critiquing Quirm).
132. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and
Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1869-71 (2003) (discussing institutional aspects of interaction be-
tween human and constitutional rights).
133. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,
66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001). cf Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain
Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 68 Fed. Reg. 39, 374 (March 21, 2002).
134. See Exparte Qurin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (authorizing military tribunals in cases involving "en-
emy belligerents").
135. See Jonathan D. Glater, A.B.A. Urges Wider Rights in Cases Tried By Tribunals, N.Y. TiMES,
Aug. 13, 2003, at A18.
136. See Philip Shenon, White House Called Target of Plane Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003, at
A7 (reporting that alleged "twentieth hijacker" Zacanas Moussaoui would be tried before military tri-
bunal if civilian courts required government to grant Moussaoui access to detainee allegedly in posses-
sion of exculpatory information).
137 No provision for judicial review is contained in the Military Order. Counsel to the President
Alberto Gonzalez has indicated that the Adminmistration believes that habeas corpus review is available,
although the Administration has argued that the applicable standard on habeas review is exceedingly
deferential. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), reh g and reh'g en banc denied,
Pagels v. Morrison, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 13717 (4th Cir. July 9, 2003) (supporting Administration's
position).
138. See Rasul v. Bush, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 4760 (S. Ct. June 28, 2004) (holding that federal courts
had jurisdiction under the habeas statute to hear petitions from Guatanamo detamees).Cf Paul Schiff
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problems undermine the global legitimacy of the military tribunals established by
the Administration.
Critics of the Administration have combined concern about these procedural
problems with concern about the appropriateness of military tribunals as a forum
for adjudicating cases involving alleged terrorist activity. They argue that either
civilian courts or international tribunals are more appropriate.139 In particular, crit-
ics assert that judges in military tribunals are intrinsically biased, because they re-
main part of the military command structure. 140
Arguments that military tribunals are per se inappropriate ignore contrary evi-
dence and countervailing values. Historical evidence suggests that when the right
procedures are m place, military tribunals can make accurate determinations of
culpability In Ex Parte Qurin, for example, a military tribunal convened during
World War II found after a three-week trial that the defendants had undertaken a
mission on orders of the German High Command to operate clandestinely in the
United States for the purpose of harming persons and property essential to the war
effort. 141 While scholars have criticized aspects of the role played by the civilian
judiciary in the case, 142 no scholar has expressed doubt about the accuracy of the
military tribunal's finding.
14 3
The Framers of the Constitution recognized that military tribunals had devel-
oped a tradition of adjudicating violations of the law of war, and found no conflict
between performance of that specified task and a sound constitutional order. 44 In-
deed, for the detainees at Guantanamo Bay captured on the battlefield, a military
tribunal with a grasp of the exigencies of combat is arguably a far more appropriate
forum than a civilian or international court lacking such knowledge. For cases re-
Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 311, 459-73 (2002) (arguing that juns-
dictional distinction between cases within U.S. temitory and cases outside that terntory has been ren-
dered obsolete).
139. See, e.g., Laura M. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military
Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1407 (2002).
140. See ORENTLICHER & GOLDMAN, supra note 131, at 660.
141. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S., at 20-21.
142. See TURLEY, supra note 130, at 735-39 (discussing series of ex parte contacts between Jus-
tices and Administration).
143. See id. (Two of the Quirm petitioners introduced evidence at their trial that they had with-
drawn from the conspiracy by contacting the Federal Bureau of Investigation. They sought to with-
draw, however, only after attempting to buy the silence of Coast Guardsman who had observed their
surreptitious landing in the United States. Under the law of conspiracy, withdrawal is an affirmative
defense to liability for subsequent acts committed by co-conspirators, but not complete defense to the
charge of conspiracy itself); U.S. v. Robinson, 217 F.3d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 2000). Cf Neal Kumar
Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1379 (2003) (arguing that withdrawal is appropriately
only partial defense because public interest favors deterrence of initial entry into conspiracy). The ef-
forts of the two defendants, while not sufficient to convince the finder of fact to acquit, ultimately re-
sulted in pardons dispensed by the President. TURLEY, supra note 130.
144. See Exparte Qurin, 317 U.S., at 31 (noting the case of British Army Major John Andre, who
was tried and convicted before a military commission convened by George Washington in 1780 after
being apprehended in disguise and with false papers within United States lines on mission to contact
the traitorous General Benedict Arnold).
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moved from the battlefield paradigm involving collateral activities such as fund-
raising for Al Qaeda, military tribunals may not be appropriate. 45 However, the
analysis of appropriateness should turn on procedural issues such as the scope of
jurisdiction asserted in the President's Order, not speculation regarding the inher-
ent nature of the forum.146
The usefulness of disaggregatmg choice of forum and procedural concerns is
even more apparent when one considers the flaws of a proposed alternative such as
an international tribunal for alleged Al Qaeda combatants apprehended on the bat-
tlefield. Problems with an international tribunal in this context emerge in the in-
terpretation of governing law and the choice of law rules that such a tribunal might
adopt. The Geneva Convention provides that combatants without uniforms may
still be considered lawful if they have taken up arms "spontaneously" to resist an
invading military force, and respect the laws of war. 147 A federal court has found
that members of the Taliban cannot invoke protection under this provision, since
they violated the laws of war by targeting civilians.148 However, an international
tribunal may be tempted to downplay the disqualifying effect of the Taliban's ac
tions. 49  An international tribunal may also apply to the Taliban and their Al
Qaeda allies the Protocol added to the Geneva Convention that protects combatants
in "wars of national liberation, even though the United States expressly declined
to ratify this Protocol because of concerns about terrorism.150
Commentators who argue that an international tribunal is inherently superior
also offer a flawed account of accuracy in adjudication. While courts and com-
mentators have rightly focused on the importance of mmimizmg "false positives" -
individuals incorrectly convicted of an offense' 51 - they have also acknowledged
the importance of mmmizmg "false negatives" - culpable individuals wrongly ad-
judicated as blameless. 152 Particularly in low-level cases of persons captured on
145. See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 130, at 1260-66 (discussing problems with jurisdictional
sweep of President's Military Order); Orentlicher & Goldman, supra note 130.
146. See Anderson, supra note 130, at 613-20.
147 See Multilateral Prtotection of War Victims, Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
3322, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 138-40.
148. See U.S. v. Lmdh, 212 F Supp. 2d 541, 557-58 (E.D. Va. 2002).
149. In so doing, members of an international tribunal would be echoing two distinguished
American law professors who made similar omission in an otherwise incisive analysis of the flaws in
the President's Military Order establishing military tribunals. See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 130, at
1264 (suggesting in passing that members of the Taliban might qualify for protection under the Geneva
Convention, while failing to note that the provision protecting combatants who "spontaneously take up
arms" also requires that such combatants refrin from targeting civilians).
150. See Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (2003) (dis-
cussing unratified Protocols). See also Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Regan to the the
U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims
(Jan. 29, 1987), reprinted in 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 910 (1987) (explaining rationale for recommending
against ratification of Protocol).
151. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that due process requires that the prosecu-
tion show a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt) (Justice Harlan concurring viewed the Court's
holding as "bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.") Id at 372.
152. See Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001) (asserting that the government, in
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the battlefield, international judges may have incentives to unduly discount the risk
of false negatives.
Consider here the case of Yaser Esam Hamdi, an apparent American citizen
allegedly apprehended with a weapon on the battlefield in Afghanistan, now de-
tamed by the United States as an "enemy combatant" without charges. 153 While
Hamdi should be either charged or released, if he were charged an international
tribunal would not necessarily provide a more accurate determination than a mili-
tary court. Hamdi's father has argued that his son was actually providing hunam-
tartan aid to Afghans. 154 International judges whose countries have not been tar-
geted by transnational networks such as Al Qaeda may wish to credit this account,
either to avoid retaliation against their countries,1 55 or because of a reluctance to
scrutinize allegedly humanitarian work. 56  A judge influenced by these factors
could make an maccurate determination of culpability Of course, the govern-
ment's indefinite detention of Hamdi or of individuals held at Guantanamo Bay
might itself be based on maccurate or biased mformation.i57 Addressing that issue
requires adequate procedures, not necessarily an international forum.
The same analysis obtains for the prosecution of officials m Saddam Hus-
sem's regime m Iraq. Here the most appropriate forum is neither a military nor an
deciding to apprehend an individual suspected of plotting terrorist activity - in that case an alleged pre-
September II plan to bomb the World Trade Center - could consider not only the probability that an
individual had engaged in such activity, but also the extent of the destruction that might have resulted if
the plan had been successful); ALAN DERSHOWrFZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE
THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 187-96 (2002) (acknowledging constitutional concern with
false positives, while arguing that the challenge of terrorism complicates issue); Laurence H. Tribe,
Trial By Fury: t4'0, Congress Must Curb Bush Military Courts, THE NEW REP Dec. 10, 2001, at 18,
20 (arguing that public interest requires adjustment of balance between false positives and false nega-
tives in terrorism cases); but see generally Ronald Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, N.Y REv.
BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002, at 44 (warning against lowering standards of proof in terrorism cases).
153. See Hamdi 316 F.3d, reh 'g and reh 'g en banc dented; Pagels 2003 U.S. App. Lexis (uphold-
ing indefinite detention with evidentiary hearing or access to counsel); cf Padilla v. Bush, 233 F
Supp.2d 564 (S.D.N.Y 2002) (upholding indefinite detention but requiring hearing and assistance of
counsel); Anthony Lewis, Civil Liberties in a Time of Terror 2003 Wis. L. REv. 257 (2003) (discuss-
ing enemy combatant detention).
154. Other detainees have made similar claims, asserting that they were caught up in the chaos of
war, and either denying that they possessed weapons at the time of their apprehension or preserving
their option to justify the need for firearms in the delivery of humanitarian aid. See Richard A. Serrano,
Detainees Launch Legal Step, L.A. TiMES, Oct. 16, 2002, at 1 (describing Kuwaiti nationals detained at
Guantanamo Bay who claimed that tribesmen had turned them over to American forces in Afghanistan
in exchange for bounty).
155. See Charles Hill, A Herculean Task: The Myth and Reality of Arab Terrorism, in THE AGE OF
TERROR: AMERICA AND THE WORLD AFTER SEPT. It 83, 104 (Strobe Talbott & Nayan Chanda eds.,
Basic Books 2001) ("European countries have taken a benign view of the presence of foreign terror-
ist organizations in their cities in a kind of tacit agreement that 'we won't bother you if you don't target
us. ").
156. See Don Van Natta Jr. with Timothy L. O'Brien, Flow of Saudis' Cash to Hamas is Scruti-
ntzed, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 17, 2003, at Al, 10 (quoting an American diplomat as saying that, "It is con-
sidered rude in the kingdom to inquire about the motives behind charity, and so Saudis don't do it.").
157 See generally LEwis, supra note 152 (criticizing Hamdi's detention and appellate court's
deferential review).
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international tribunal, but an Iraqi court.Si No other tribunal has a comparable
stake in such prosecutions, which will help set the tone and direction of subsequent
regimes. 5 9 An American military tribunal may err on the side of culpability, lack-
mg a comprehensive understanding of the pressures experienced by Iraqis under
Saddam Hussein. An international tribunal will not provide the sense of empow-
erment that will emerge from Iraqis confronting and coping with challenges from
their own past.'
60
In choosing the appropriate forum, a transiton-centered approach would con-
sider 1) the stake of the entity sponsoring the forum,'
16' 2) the likelihood of error, 162
and, 3) the availability of a functional forum in the entity with the greatest stake. 
1
63
Procedural protections such as limits on the jurisdiction of military tribunals, judi-
cial review, access to exculpatory evidence, and unimpaired access to counsel
would also obtain. These conditions would fulfill the transition-based criteria of
inclusion, institutional repertoire, and redress.
Considering these factors promotes a forum-selection process that can adapt
to changing contexts and circumstances. For matters regarding September 11 and
related Al Qaeda efforts to attack persons or property within the United States,
America clearly has the greatest stake. However, other nations also have an inter-
est, given the presence of nationals from many countries among the victims of Sep-
tember 11.164 Assuming that both the United States and the international commu-
nity could provide a functioning system the dispositive factor would be the
likelihood of error.
For alleged low-level Al Qaeda combatants purportedly captured on the bat-
tlefield, such as those held at Guantanamo Bay, an international tribunal might
yield too many false negatives, if judges unduly discounted the threat posed by
"little fish."' 65 A military tribunal operating with the benefit of procedural safe-
guards would be appropriate for trying such individuals. However, limiting the
jurisdiction of military tribunals to cases of "enemy belligerents" would require
trials in United States civilian courts for alleged Al Qaeda operatives engaged not
158. See Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Patrick E. Tyler, lraqis Plan War-Crimes Court; G.L.s to Stay
Until Elections, N.Y TIMES, July 16, 2003, at A9.
159. See generally Diane F Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: the Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991) (arguing for the prosecution of primary perpe-
trators of human rights abuses).
160. See MINOW, supra note 7, at 61-83 (discussing importance of redress and voice for victims in
developing democratic traditions).
161. See Gary J. Simson, The Choice-of-Law Revolution in the United States: Notes on Rereading
Von Mehren, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 125, 126-28 (2003) (discussing choice of law principles).
162. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) (one element of procedural due process
analysis is "risk of error").
163. See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (holding that long-time resident of Indiana with no
demonstrated ties to Confederate military could not be tried before military tribunal when civilian
courts were functioning).
164. Mark A Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neightborhood: Terroritst Crim, Taliban Guilt, and the
Asymentires of the Internaional Legal Order, 81 N.C.L. Rev 1, 67-69 (2002).
165. See Tribe, supra note 151, at 18.
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in active hostilities but instead m collateral activities such as fundraismg. Al
Qaeda higher-ups, including those presently confined m undisclosed locations sub-
ject to United States control, might be more appropriate candidates for eventual
trial before international tribunals. Animus against such individuals rmght run too
ugh in the United States to control the nsk of false positives. In contrast, factfind-
ers on an international tribunal might be sufficiently dispassionate to control this
risk, while also being cognizant of the danger posed by major players in Al
Qaeda.
166
In considering the appropriate forum for the trial of former Ba'athist officials,
considerations of stake are paramount, making Iraqi courts the best choice. Al-
though a desire for retribution might increase the risk of false positives, such a risk
would be mmunized by procedures to ensure representation of a cross-section of
Iraqis, including members of the Sunm minority most supportive of the Ba'athist
regime. However, years of Ba'athist rule and the chaos attending military Inter-
vention have required the rebuilding of the Iraqi judiciary. 167 Trial by Iraqi courts
could challenge the fragile security framework in Iraq and exacerbate ethmic strife.
If Iraqi or coalition officials could not respond to such concerns, Iraq would be left
without a functional forum for trying such cases. An international tribunal would
be the second-best choice, given the international community's stake in holding
major Ba'athist officials accountable for the crimes against humnamty committed
during Saddam's rule.Disaggregating forum and procedure in this fashion would
promote transitions. The flexibility built into the forum-choice factors would serve
inclusion, as would commitment to norms of procedural fairness accepted under
international law. The forum-choice factors would expand institutional repertoire,
avoiding the rigid consequences risked by both the Administration and its critics.
Finally focusing on stake would emphasize redress for the victims of attacks on
civilians. 168 Disaggregating forum and procedure would build legitimacy for anti-
166. This might hold especially for mainstream Islamic jurists, who understand the corruption of
Islamic teaching wrought by Bin Laden. See ESPOSITO, supra note 42, at 20, 32 (noting bin Laden's
departures from mainstream Islamic thought); EL FADL, supra note 42, at 205-09 (analyzing arguments
of jurists that persons who kill innocents in pursuit of political goals lose the consideration accorded
rebels under Islamic teaching); GRAHAM E. FULLER, THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM 60 (2003)
("[E]rroneous and distorted understandings of Islam can emerge that can serve to justify violence or
even terror.").
167. See Hassan bm Talal, Can Democracy Take Root in the Islamic World? Seeing Iraq's Future
By Looking at Its Past, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2003, at Al 7 (focusing on need for functioning judiciary in
Iraq); cf. Ahmed Hashim, Saddam Hussain and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq: The Quest for Legiti-
macy and Power, 57 MIDDLE EAST J. 9, 29-32 (2003) (discussing Saddam's efforts to destroy the Iraqi
military as an institution that could challenge his rule). See generally KANAN MAKIYA, REPUBLIC OF
FEAR: THE POLITICS OF MODERN IRAQ 46-72 (1998) (discussing torture and repression under Ba'athist
regime).
168. In addition, redress would require compensation for "false positives" wrongfully detained
and for civilians harmed in the course of antiterronsm efforts. The failure to spend money appropriated
by Congress to assist civilians injured by the United States military intervention against the Taliban and
A] Qaeda in Afghanistan is a vivid example of a recent failure of redress. See April Witt, After the Air-
strikes, Just Silence; No Compensation, Little Aid for Afghan Victims of US. Raids, WASH. POST, April
28, 2003, at Ai 7 In Northern Iraq, United States Army commander operating largely autonomously
from the central occupation authonty has been successful in part by promptly compensating Iraqi civil-
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terrorism efforts, and defuse processes of social comparison that exacerbate polari-
zation.
CONCLUSION
Measures to effect transitions toward democracy and the rule of law have
dominated United States policy m the aftermath of September 11. The current
Administration has generally pursued a preemptive approach, emphasizing force
and punitive measures, dealing largely with elites, and downplaymg demands for
equality made by popular movements abroad. Unfortunately, the preemptive ap-
proach often generates polarization, not transition. Social science research indi-
cates that excessive reliance on force and punitive measures can spawn social iden-
tities shaped by opposition to American interests and social comparisons such as
views of the Arab-Israeli conflict that portray the United States as subsidizing un-
just policies. The preemptive approach also yields forms of social capital such as
authenticity entrepreneurship that leverage oppositional identities and comparisons
to produce violence against innocents. Critiquing the preemptive approach is eas-
ier than devising a constructive alternative. One alternative, the state-skeptical ap-
proach, abjures force and punitive measures. While state-skeptics may ease transi-
tions through the re-framing of social identities and comparisons, they fail to
address the "spoiler" role played by authenticity entrepreneurs.
To avoid these blind spots, a multilateral transition approach integrates the in-
sights of social science research and comparative law and politics. Responding to
social identity, social comparison, and social capital formation requires a multilat-
eral perspective focused on transnational communities. In a diasporated world knit
together by technology, attention to the transnational flow of people, information,
and resources is crucial.
A multilateral approach seeks to influence these flows, guided by three over-
lapping factors identified by comparative scholars: institutional repertoire, mclu-
sion, and redress. Institutional repertoire requires a range of organizational struc
tures, strategies, and discourses, each operating as a check on the power of the
others. The flourishing of civil society is one element of this repertoire, comple-
mented by a viable governmental authority that can resort to force and legal sanc
tions when necessary to achieve legitimate public objectives. Inclusiveness re-
quires a polity such as the United States, which seeks to exert influence around the
world, to acknowledge that its relevant audience is not merely domestic but trans-
national, by acting to minimize global inequality
Redress requires the most delicate balance of the transitional elements. A
polity such as the United States that seeks to defend its interests and effect transi-
tions on a global scale should acknowledge responsibility for damage to innocents
ians for losses suffered dunng ongoing efforts to defeat guerilla forces; Michael R. Gordon, 101" Air-
borne Scores Success in Northern Iraq; A Reconstruction Effort is Led by the Military, N.Y TiMES,
Sept. 4, 2003, at Al, (analyzing approach used by Army unit, which also includes substantial delega-
tion to newly established Iraqi local governmental units).
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caused by efforts to vindicate these goals. Redress also mandates that survivors of
past abuses and overreaching have access to remedies, to effect closure on disputes
and clear the way for new mstitution-building.
A multilateral transition approach clarifies analysis of current issues such as
the enforcement of immigration law after September 11, the regulation of terrorist
organizations, and the adjudication of alleged violations of international humani-
taran law. A transition-centered approach to immigration policy would curb na-
tionality-based umigration enforcement and promote family unity, thereby lever-
aging immigration to the United States to give other areas in the world a broader
stake in the struggle against terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. Regulation
of terrorist organizations would stress not only legal sanctions to disrupt the infra-
structure relied on by violent authenticity entrepreneurs, but also support for non-
violent alternatives, reform of governmental policies that catalyze violent opposi-
tion, and a fresh start through "transition relief' for organizations that
demonstrated that they had implemented substantial and durable institutional re-
forms to materially reduce violence. Adjudication of alleged violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law would disaggregate issues of forum selection and proce-
dure, allowing for flexibility in the forum selection process and requiring
procedures in all forums to ensure justice and preserve legitimacy.
Adopting a multilateral transition approach stressing institutional repertoire,
inclusion, and redress will not ensure the rule of law or erase transnational vio-
lence. Transitions are unpredictable. Forms of social capital that foster violence
and undermine the rule of law can always emerge from the social identities and
comparisons generated by collective human endeavors. However, a transition-
based approach at least highlights the right questions. That is a necessary first step
in setting the course of transnational law and policy after September 11.
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